Abstract

This RPIP supports a followup vote ratifying plans to tie up loose ends in the Saturn specification. It also provides a platform for community members to raise and discuss any as-yet-unnoticed problems in those plans.

Specification

• The “stake Transaction” section of RPIP-59 SHALL be replaced with the following:

#### `stake` Transaction
- `stake` SHALL stake the remaining 31 ETH to the beacon chain to make a complete validator
- After ETH is assigned to a validator, the Node Operator SHALL be able to call a function to dissolve that validator
- If `stake` has not been called within `time_before_dissolve` after the ETH was assigned to a validator, any user SHALL be able to call a function to dissolve that validator. The user calling this function SHALL receive `dissolve_reward` (taken from validator's Node Operator's bond).
- When a validator is dissolved:
  - Unstaked balance SHALL be returned to the deposit pool
  - The bonded value SHALL be recoverable. This MAY require further action from the node operator. This MAY temporarily require additional ETH from the node operator.

• The parameter table in the Deposit Mechanics Specification section of RPIP-59 SHALL get a new parameter called dissolve_reward with an initial value of 0.01 ETH and a guardrail of ≤0.2 ETH

Rationale

Per the pDAO charter, we prioritize permissionlessness and decentralization where possible. Per the oDAO charter, the oDAO seeks to minimize its role where possible. This seems to be a case where we can fairly painlessly move from oDAO reliance to relying on any user eventually acting.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

Citation

Valdorff, "RPIP-67: Permissionless Dissolving [DRAFT]," Rocket Pool Improvement Proposals, no. 67, February 2025. [Online serial]. Available: https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-67.